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REAL RISKS IN A VIRTUALIZED WORLD: HOW VIRTUALIZATION IS CHANGING THE 
WAY WE MANAGE, ASSESS, AND MITIGATE RISK 
Brian Boyer, Fort Hays State University 
Keyu Jiang, Fort Hays State University 
Robert Meier, Fort Hays State University 
Hongbiao Zeng, Fort Hays State University 
A dramatic shift has started to take place in the last decade that is having a pronounced impact on how organizations view 
information security. Large datacenters and small server rooms alike are being impacted by the development and growth 
of virtualization and the many benefits it provides. This essay will examine how hardware virtualization has changed the 
landscape of datacenter risk management and how organizations must adapt their security posture to those changes. As 
mainstream hypervisors like VMware ESXi, Citrix XenServer, and Microsoft Hyper-V become more affordable and easier 
to implement, their use in providing lpw-cost, high-utilization solutions is steadily becoming an industry standard, even 
for smaller shops. Organizations must understand how to assess, manage, and mitigate new types of risk unique to 
virtualization. By examining the technology behind virtualization, the risks associated with it, and the methods 
organizations can use to mitigate and minimize those risks, we will see that virtualization, when implemented properly, 
can provide a secure, highly beneficial technology on which datacenters can be built. 
INTRODUCTION 
A dramatic shift has taken place in the last decade that 
is having a pronounced impact on how organizations view 
information security. Experts predict that by 2012 
approximately 50% of x86 server workloads will be 
virtualized (Gartner, 2009). It's a phenomenon that is 
undoubtedly gaining momentum. Gartner's Phil Dawson 
went so far as to state that visualization will be " the highest-
impact issue challenging infrastructure and operations 
through 20 15" (Gartner, 20 I 0). Though virtualization as a 
technology has been around since the 1960s when IBM 
developed it for use with its large mainframes (Reuben, 
2007), a number of factors have led to its marked increase 
over the last decade. First, the cost of hardware to support 
virtualization has gotten significantly smaller in recent years 
as processor, memory, and storage components have 
advanced (Koomey, Belady, Patterson, & Santos, 2009). 
The power oftoday's hardware has outpaced operating 
system (OS) and application utilization so much that most 
resources go unused. Second, the development of 
processors designed specifically for virtualization, like the 
Intel VT and AMD SMV processors (Perez, van Doorn, & 
Sailer, 2008), along with the development of x86 virtual host 
operating systems (VM Tech, 2010), like VMware's ESXi 
and Microsoft's Hyper-V, has made virtualization available 
to organizations that previously couldn't afford it. Third, the 
benefit organizations get from rolling out a virtual 
environment, such as better utilization of hardware, lower 
maintenance and renewal costs, increased availability and 
portability, and a smaller carbon footprint, have spurred 
CIOs around the globe to hang their reputation (and their 
company's bottom line) on virtualization's very real benefits 
(Pias, 2007). 
23 
Though virtualization provides a number of benefits, it 
is not without issues, and security is at the top of the list 
(Price, 2008). One of the most common pitfalls during the 
introduction of any new technology is that security is 
considered only as an afterthought. Rather than building it 
into the planning and testing phases, too often security 
considerations are left for after the technology deployment is 
nearing completion or even already in production. This can 
cause considerable difficulty and cost if the technology is 
implemented using inappropriate security practices, and 
therefore must be refashioned in order to adhere to the 
organization's security policies. Virtualization is no 
exception to this pitfall. Gartner predicts that 60% of 
virtualized servers will be less secure than their physical 
counterparts through 2012. In this essay we will examine 
the benefits and risks associated with virtualization in order 
to determine if it truly presents a secure, long-term solution 
for enterprise and small business server deployments. Much 
has been written about the advantages of virtualization, but 
what sort of vulnerabilities are associated with it, and are 
those vulnerabilities worth the risk? What security controls 
should be implemented in order to mitigate vulnerabilities 
unique to virtualization? This essay will shed light on 
virtualization's unique security issues and identify the 
appropriate steps for minimizing its vulnerabilities and 
properly deploying a virtual infrastructure. In so doing, we 
will see that virtualization, if implemented properly, may not 
only be a paradigm shift changing the way we think about 
datacenters and computing (Hau, 2007), but also the way we 
manage, assess, and mitigate datacenter risk. 
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VffiTUALIZA TION AND ITS MANY BENEFITS 
In order to accurately evaluate its unique risks, we must 
first have some understanding of how virtualization works. 
As mentioned earlier, virtualization as a technology has been 
around since the 1960's when IBM developed it for use with 
its large mainframes (Reuben, 2007). However, the largest 
share oftoday's market is comprised of two types of 
virtualization technology (IDC, 2010). The first is called 
hardware virtualization, or ful l virtualization, and is the 
primary focus of this paper. The three core components of 
hardware virtualization are the host OS, which enables 
booting and provides a local management interface into the 
system; the hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM) 
as it is sometimes called; and the guest operating systems, or 
virtual machines (VMs). The hypervisor is "a thin software 
layer" (Price, 2009) which runs on top of the host OS. Its 
primary purpose is to manage resource allocation and task 
scheduling for the guest virtual machines. It is responsible 
for presenting abstracted hardware to the guests, and for 
controlling the flow of instructions between that hardware 
and the guest OSs. The hypervisor is also capable of 
partitioning the host's physical resources in such a way that 
the VMs are isolated from one another, so that they only 
have access to their own resources. The hypervisor gets its 
Journal of Business & leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching 
2011, Vol. 7, 23-36 
magic from its ability to present the guest operating system 
abstracted hardware. The guest in tum "sees" the abstracted 
hardware as if it were actual hardware. It is unaware that it 
is being presented "virtual" resources, including virtual 
CPU(s), memory, network interface card(s), and storage. 
Therefore, multiple guest operating systems can sit on one 
physical server, each unaware of the other it is sharing 
resources with other VMs on the same physical machine. 
Examples of hardware virtualization include VMware's ESX 
and ESXi, Microsoft's Hyper-V, and Citrix's XenServer. 
With the second type of virtualization, called software 
virtualization, the hypervisor runs as an application on a 
standard OS, such as Windows or Linux. It doesn't have 
direct control over the physical hardware (Price, 2009), and 
therefore the hypervisor is dependent on the traditional OS 
for access to the hardware. Resources are therefore 
emulated rather than abstracted. This type of virtualization 
is primarily used in testing and development environments 
and typically not used in production. Examples include 
VMware's VMware Workstation, Microsoft's Virtual PC, 
and Parallels Desktop 5. The Figure provides a visual 
representation of the differences between hardware 
virtualization abstraction and the emulation of software 
virtualization. 
FIGURE 
Representation of the Difference between Hardware and Software Virtualization 
(Solarvps, 2010) 
There is strong statistical evidence that virtualization 
now plays a prominent role in the implementation plans of 
many organizations' datacenters (Gartner, 20 I 0). A recent 
CDW survey of 387 IT executives from organizations with 
100 or more employees found that more than 90% of those 
24 
surveyed said they had begun implementation of 
virtualization at some level (Caraher, 2010). There is a 
reason why virtualization is being implemented at such an 
astounding rate and why it has become a hotbed for research 
and literature- the many benefits it provides saves 
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organizations time and money (Caraher, 2010). Though the 
leadership of many organizations may not understand the 
technology behind virtualization, they certainly understand 
the importance of remaining technically relevant in their 
chosen line of business. The ability to effectively adapt to 
technological change has become a vital component of 
organizational leadership (Kearns, 2004), and the benefits 
virtualization promises-financial savings, energy savings, 
more effective disaster recovery, and lower administrative 
overhead-have organizational leaders appetites whetted. 
Hardware virtualization possesses three key features 
which are the source for its unique benefits. Encapsulation 
occurs when the hypervisor keeps all components of a VM, 
including the OS, applications and all virtual hardware, 
combined in a single logical unit (Price, 2008). 
Encapsulation allows multiple VMs to reside on a single 
host without stepping on one another's toes. The VMs are 
therefore logically isolated from one another despite residing 
on the same physical hardware. Interposition occurs when 
the hypervisor manages all privileged operations to the 
hardware and intercepts I/Os via I/0 abstraction, thus 
presenting a single set of resources to multiple virtual 
machines (Price, 2008). The hypervisor, in effect, manages 
25 
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resources in such a way that they appear to the guest OS as a 
real piece of hardware rather than abstracted hardware. 
Resources on one physical host are therefore shared among 
multiple VMs. Considering that only five to eight percent of 
traditional servers' resources are used (Plas, 2007), resource 
sharing, as interposition is sometimes called, enables the 
physical server's hardware to be fully utilized. The 
hypervisor can also allocate and retract resources based on 
what a particular VM needs at a given time, thus resulting in 
better utilization of resources. Introspection provides 
monitoring and auditing capabilities unique to virtualization. 
Because the monitoring and auditing takes place outside the 
confines of the encapsulated VM, audit logging and process 
monitoring, oftentimes the first target of an attacker, cannot 
be tampered with in the event the VM is compromised 
(Scafone, Souppaya, & Hoffman, (2010). Additionally, 
introspection can modify a guest's state (King, Chen, 
Verbowski, Wang & Lorch, 2006), including capturing an 
image of a VM at a specified time, called a snapshot, 
applying patches to a VM, or mounting file systems to a 
VM. Each one of these features provides unique benefits. 
Table 1lists each benefit and the feature(s) that correspond 
to it: 
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TABLE l 
Benefits Unique to Hardware Virtualization 
Description Technology Benefit 
VM portability introduces new Encapsulation ./ Reducedrecoverytline 
methods for recovering systems in objective (RTO) 
the event of a fail ure or a disaster. ./ Increased recovery point 
objectives (RPOs) 
./ Reduction in fiscal cost for 
disaster recovery site 
VMs can be quickly provisioned Encapsulation ./ Reduction in fiscal cost 
from a predefined template, Interposition during the setup and 
allowing for image maintenance of deployed 
standardization including system physical systems 
hardening and baselining 
Centralized management of Encapsulation ./ Reduction in fiscal cost of 
multiple systems within a single Interposition administering multiple 
virtual infrastructure via the Introspection physical systems, including, 
virtual management system patching, system monitoring, 
and system recovery 
./ Reduction of system 
downtime due to multiple 
services running on a single 
physical server 
By hosting multiple VMs on a Encapsulation ./ Reduction in fiscal cost for 
single piece of hardware, fewer Interposition power consumption 
physical resources are required ./ Potential savings for 
per datacenter qualifying Green IT 
Initiatives (Symantec, 2010) 
By hosting multiple VMs on a Interposition ./ Reduction of fiscal cost for 
single piece of hardware, fewer the purchasing, maintenance, 
physical servers are required and support of physical 
servers 
The hypervisor provides a lower Introspection ./ A more secure environment 
layer from which VM security can be constructed by 
logging, auditing, and intrusion logging and auditing outside 
detection and prevention can be theVM 
performed ./ Intrusion prevention and 
detection can monitor 
systems more effectively by 
leveraging the hypervisor 
VMs can be frozen at a specific Encapsulation ./ Forensic analysis of a 
point in time (called a snapshot), Introspection compromised system 'is 
retuned to a point in tline, and greatly enhanced by the 
prior system activity that was ability to replay attacks 
recorded can be replayed after the ./ System recovery from a 
attack has occurred compromise is greatly 




Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012), Vol. 7 [2011], No. 1, Art. 4
http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol7/iss1/4
Boyer, Jiang, Meier and Zeng 
RISKS UNIQUE TO YIRTUALIZATION 
Paradoxically, the same features that are the source for 
virtualization's unique benefits-encapsulation, 
interposition, and introspection- are also the source for its 
unique vulnerabilities. As is often the case, additional layers 
of technology that provide greater power and ease-of-use 
also create additional vulnerabilities (Scafone, Souppaya, & 
Hoffman, 2010). Encapsulation, for example, allows VMs 
to be highly portable, able to be quickly moved from one 
piece of hardware to another (Chen & Noble, 2001 ). Such 
portability drastically reduces the recovery time objective 
(RTO) while also reducing the fiscal cost of maintaining 
recovery sites with one-to-one hardware for each physical 
server. However, such portability also creates an attack 
vector by allowing the theft of entire systems via replication 
of the VMs' disk image files over a network (Price, 2008). 
Such attack vectors do not exist with traditional servers 
because they are directly tied to the server hardware on 
which the OS is installed. Though interposition greatly 
reduces admi'nistrative overhead by allowing VMs to be 
quickly provisioned from a predefined template, it also 
opens the door for administrative misuse resulting in what's 
called VM sprawl, or the proliferation of VMs due to the 
ease of provisioning inherent in virtualization (Scafone, 
Souppaya, & Hoffman, 2010). If an organization does not 
manage its system provisioning using the appropriate change 
controls, any number of compromised VMs could easily be 
deployed from a corrupt template. Likewise, VMs lacking 
the appropriate hardening and baselining measures could be 
put on the wire and into production. Though this is also true 
with traditional servers, the ease with which VMs can be 
provisioned in a virtual infrastructure increases the 
likelihood of a corrupt system being introduced into the 
environment. By leveraging the hypervisor to monitor and 
audit VMs, introspection provides a unique method for 
detecting and preventing intrusion (Chen & Noble, 2001). 
27 
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However, by opening a communication channel between the 
host and VM, it also creates another attack vector for 
attackers to exploit (King, Chen, Verbowski, Wang & 
Lorch, 2006). A virtual-machine based rootkit (VMBR), for 
example, could be used by an attacker to exploit the 
hypervisor in order to gain access to a guest, thus breaking 
down the security framework on which virtualization is 
built. Though there is currently no known VMBR that can 
bypass the isolation provided by the hardware virtualization 
architecture, King, et al. (2006) showed with the creation of 
SubVirt that it is possible to do so using software 
virtualization. It is likely only a matter of time until the 
attack vectors created by introspection are exploited in 
hardware virtualization (Price, 2008). 
Though some risks are unique to virtualization, a 
number of other risks are common to both virtualization and 
traditional hardware servers, but manifested themselves in 
different ways. For example, unhardened and misconfigured 
systems are a vulnerability of both virtual and physical 
servers. However, a virtual infrastructure presents additional 
hardening and configuration concerns due to the additional 
components involved, e.g., the host machine, virtual 
switches, and how those components interrelate with the 
guest OSs (Scafone, Souppaya, & Hoffman, 2010). Such 
layers of complexity only prove to further complicate an 
analysis of the risks of virtualization. One must not only 
account for vulnerabilities unique to virtualization, but also 
account for those traditional vulnerabilities that are 
exacerbated by virtualization. Though this realization 
complicates the risk analysis, acknowledgment is a critical 
piece to fully understanding the unique characteristics of 
virtualization as opposed to traditional server 
implementations. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
vulnerabilities unique to virtualization in addition to those 
traditional vulnerabilities that are exacerbated by 
virtualization: 
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TABLE2 
Risks Unique to Hardware Virtualization 
Description 
Encapsulation of VMs into a single set of files 
enables them to be highly portable. Where 
traditional systems were tied to a specific piece 
of hardware, VMs are not and can be quickly 
transported, even in a running state. 
The host system adds an additional layer of 
technology which must be accounted for when 
securing the infrastructure. A VMBR installs 
an additional, ultrathin virtual machine monitor 
between the VM and host, thus allowing it to 
go undetected by the VM. 
This is no different than a traditional system 
being compromised, however with 
virtualization there are additional layers of 
technology (namely the virtual host, virtual 
networking, virtual storage, and the 
interrelatedness to the VMs) that must be 
accounted for. 
Because VMs are so easy to provision when 
compared to physical servers, the likelihood of 
unpatched and misconfigured systems being 
deployed is increased. Likewise, the likelihood 
of VMs being deployed without going through 
the proper change control measures is 
increased. 
Much of the communication that occurs 
between the host and VMs, and between VMs 
residing on the same host, cannot be monitored 
by traditional methods. For example, two VMs 
located on the same host communicate via a 
virtual switch, yet that network traffic never 
leaves the host's internal bus. 
Because multiple VMs reside on a single host, 
or host cluster, the failure of a piece of 
hardware will effect multiple systems. 
Example of Threat 
Theft of VM from compromised host 
SubVirt, Blue Pill 
Compromise of an unpatched system 
Multiple VMs being created from an 
infected template 
Network intrusion detection system 
does not flag suspicious traffic 
between two VMs located on the 
same host. 
20 VMs fail due to a power surge that 
brings down a single server rack of 
hosts machines 
RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY qualitative risk assessment method was chosen primarily due 
to the desire for a broad perspective of the risks associated 
with virtualization- a perspective built from the literature 
and research that had been done and not tied to any specific 
implementation or historical data. A view of the risks 
unique to virtualization was sought as a phenomenon in toto, 
from the general to the specific. In accordance to SP 800-
30, risk-level matrix (Table 3) and risk scale tables (Table 4) 
were created and provide an initial starting point for the risk 
analysis. 
In order to effectively perform a risk vs. benefit analysis 
for hardware virtualization, a framework must be chosen on 
which to build the investigation. NIST's SP 800-30 Risk 
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems 
provides just such a framework that can be used by the 
general public for a wide range of assessments (Harris, 
2008). Comparing the vulnerabilities of hardware 
virtualization and the methods and controls available to 
mitigate them with its benefits will allow us to determine if 
virtualization is truly a secure datacenter solution. A 
28 
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Low: 10 X 1.0 = 10 
Low: 10 X 0.5 = 5 
Low: 10 X 0.1 = 1 
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TABLE3 
Risk Level Matrix 
Impact 
Medium (50) 
Medium: 50 X 1.0 = 50 
Low: 50 X 0.5 = 25 





High: 100 X 1.0 = 100 
Medium: 100 X 0.5 =50 
Low: 100 X 0.1 = 10 
If a hardware virtualization risk is evaluated as a high risk, the risk may prohibit the 
implementation of virtualization if the likelihood is high, or if corrective measures 
are not available to eliminate or properly mitigate the risk. 
If a hardware virtualization risk is evaluated as a medium risk, the risk may deter the 
implementation of virtualization if the likelihood is high, or if corrective measures 
are not available to eliminate or properly mitigate the risk. 
If a hardware virtualization risk is evaluated as a low risk, corrective measures are 
recommended in order to mitigate the risk 
RISK VERSUS BENEFIT ANALYSIS underway, yet only 25% of server workloads expected to be 
virtualized by the end of 2010 (Caraher, 2010), many 
organizations are asking the same question, "Is virtualization 
a viable, safe solution?" (Pias, 2007). 
Now that the benefits and risks unique to hardware 
virtualization have been defined, and a framework 
established on which to build the risk analysis, we must now 
perform the qualitative risk analysis, and from those results 
determine if hardware virtualization provides a secure, cost-
effective datacenter solution. With more than 80% of 
organizations with some sort of virtualization project 
The risk level table below illustrates our findings from 
the Literature using the risk level matrix and risk scale tables. 
The values assigned for the likelihood and magnitude of 
impact of the vulnerabilities were determined from the 
research we performed and are found in Table 5. 
TABLES 
Virtual Environment Qualitative Risk Level Values 
Vulnerability Likelihood Magnitude of Likelihood/Impact Score Risk 
Impact Level 
VM Portability Medium High 50xl.O =50 50 
Virtual Machine Based 
Low High 100x0.1 = 10 10 Rootkit (VMBR) 
Unhardened or 
Medium Medium 50x0.5 = 25 25 Misconfigured System 
VM Sprawl High Low 10xl.O = 10 10 
Virtual Communication 
High Low 10xl.O = 10 10 Channels 
Natural or Manmade 
Low High lOOxO.l = 10 10 Disaster 
29 
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Though Table 5 gives us a very basic idea of the 
likelihood and magnitude of impact for the vulnerabilities, it 
does not account for their mitigation. Without such 
information a true comparison of the benefits and risks is not 
possible. A mitigated risk scale is needed in order to 
evaluate the numeric values of each risk after mitigation 
controls are applied. Once we have the qualitative risk value 
for each of the vulnerabilities, we will assign values to each 
mitigation control and apply them to the numeric values for 
each risk. This is important for evaluating if the risk 
associated with virtualization warrants the benefits it has to 
offer. Table 6 associates the mitigated risk values with a 
meaningful explanation that will ultimately be used to 
determine if the risk outweighs the benefit. 
Mitigated Risk Value 
Very High 
15.01 and above 
High 
10.01 - 15.00 
Medium 
5.01 - 10.00 
Low 
0 - 5.00 
TABLE6 
Mitigated Risk Scale 
Mitigated Risk Description 
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 15.01 or higher, almost no 
correlating organizational benefit will outweigh the amount of risk associated 
with the implementation of this element. Extreme care must be taken in 
implementing this element to minimize exposure to the risk. 
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 10.01 - 15.00, the correlating 
organizational benefit must be very strong. Extreme care must be taken in 
implementing this element to ensure the proper mitigation steps have been 
performed. 
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 5.01 - 10.00, the correlating 
organizational benefit must be relatively strong. Moderate care must be taken in 
implementing this element to ensure the proper mitigation steps have been 
performed. 
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 0 - 5.00, the correlating 
organizational benefit can be of moderate value. 
Now we must determine the mitigated risk value for 
each of the vulnerabilities we've identified. We will be able 
to use these values to determine the significance of the 
vulnerabili ty as it relates to the benefits the organization will 
receive fTOm implementing virtualization. The table below 
takes the vulnerability and its associated risk level, and then 
describes the mitigation controls for each to determine the 
mitigated risk level. Each mitigation step is assigned a 
numeric value ranging from 0 to 1. Numeric assignments 
closer to 0 provide a greater amount of mitigation, while 
those closer to 1 do an inferior job of mitigating the 
vulnerability. Vulnerabilities with more than one mitigation 
control have the mitigation value of each control applied to 
the risk level value to determine the final mitigated risk 
value as shown in Table 7. 
30 
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TABLE7 
Virtual Environment Mitigated Risk Level Values 
Risk Level Mitigation Mitigation Mitigated Risk 
Vulnerability Value Controls Score Value 
VM Portability 25 ./ Physical security of storage .8x.4x.9x.7x50 10.08 
area where VMs are kept (.8) = 10.08 
./ Strict access controls applied to 
encapsulated VMs so that only 
authorized users have access (.4 
) 
./ Network perimeter controls 
applied to limit minimize 
external access to VMs (.9) 
./ Policies and procedures in 
place to minimize the 
likelihood of VMs being copied 
to unauthorized target (.7) 
Virtual Machine 10 ./ Ensure systems are kept up-to- .4x.7x.9x10 = 2.52 
Based Rootkit date with the latest patches, 1.40 
(VMBR) anti-virus definitions, etc. (.4) 
./ Install virtual-specific host 
based intrusion detection or 
prevention systems (.7) 
./ Development of ultra-thin 
hypervisors reduces the risk of 
VMBR (.9) 
Unhardened or 25 ./ Ensure proper change control .4x.7x25 = 5.00 7.00 
Misconfigured process is in place for system, 
System changes, hardening, and 
monitoring (.4) 
./ Create systems from "golden" 
template that is configured 
according to organizational 
security standards (.7) 
VM Sprawl 10 ./ Ensure proper change control .4x.6x10 2.40 
process is in place for new 
system deployment (.4) 
./ Monitor environment to track 
new systems being created (.6) 
Virtual 10 ./ Ensure proper change control .4x.7x10 = 2.80 2.80 
Communication process is in place for creation 
Channels and management of virtual 
environment (.4) 
./ Utilize virtualized-specific 
security tools to monitor and 
manage virtual communication 
channels (.7) 
Natural or 10 ./ Setup offsite disaster recovery .3x.9x10 = 2.70 2.70 
Manmade site for fault tolerance (.3) 
Disaster ./ Configure local resources in 
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We now have all the pieces in place so we can evaluate 
whether the benefits of implementing a hardware 
virtualization infrastructure are warranted given the unique 
risks associated with it. As mentioned earlier, the goal is to 
perform a holistic analysis that includes both virtualization 
risk management and virtualization's benefits as they relate 
to organizational needs. To do this, we must look at the 
mitigated risks of virtualization while also keeping in mind 
its benefits. Hence, we are not only evaluating the security 
aspects of hardware virtualization, but also the impact the 
benefits ofvirtualization will have on an organization's 
Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching 
2011, Vol. 7, 23-36 
business objectives and the fulfillment of its mission. The 
table below summarizes the findings by pulling together the 
results of the information we have gathered thus far. Most 
of the vulnerabilities can be directly associated to a benefit 
by connecting the two via the virtualization technology they 
have in common. For example, the vulnerability of VM 
Portability can be correlated to the benefit Recovery Time 
because both use the underlying technology of 
Encapsulation. It should be noted, however, that not all 
vulnerabilities correlate directly to a benefit. These are noted 




Virtual Machine Based 
Rootkit (VMBR) & 
VM Escape 












VM Portability has a high mitigated risk 
value; however the benefit of recovery 
time, especially during disaster recovery 
planning and in calculating the RTOs and 
RPOs for critical systems, is an enormous 
benefit. Extraordinary care must be taken 
during the testing, development, and 
implementation of the virtual infrastructure 
to ensure the risks associated with VM 
portability are addressed using physical 
security and access control; however the 
benefit will outweigh the risk for most 
organizations. 
There is no clear benefit associated with 
VMBRs, so an organization would have to 
be willing to accept this risk as part of their 
hardware virtualization implementation, 
and ensure the appropriate security controls 
are built into it. Properly patching, 
configuring and using standard best 
practices, like disabling unnecessary 
hardware and services, goes a long way in 
reducing the risk of VMBR and VM 
Escape. Because the mitigated risk level is 
low, and other benefits very high, this is a 
risk most organizations would be willing to 
accept. 
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Determination 
Bill Hau notes that the virtualization risks 
are not solely comprised of technical 
problems. Like any information 
technology, it requires people to be trained 
and processes put in place to ensure system 
security is developed properly and 
maintained (Hau, 2007). Though 
technology of virtualization might require 
unique procedures for hardening and 
configuring the virtual environment, the 
methods for doing so are no different than 
any other technology. The fiscal savings 
from being able to centrally manage, 
monitor, and audit multiple VMs adds 
further value. 
Again, this is more of a "people and 
processes" (Hau, 2007) issue than a 
technical risk. Ironically, one of the major 
strengths of virtualization, i.e., the ability to 
provision a system in a matter of minutes, 
has the potential for becoming a major 
vulnerability if not managed properly. 
Security must be built into the virtual 
infrastructure from the beginning, and a 
major part of that is having the proper 
procedures and change controls in place to 
maintain a secure environment. Add to that 
the benefit of using a golden template that 
is hardened and configured to an 
organization's standards as the base image 
for all VM deployments and the benefits far 
outweigh the risks. 
Introspection and interposition are two of 
the more powerful features of the 
hypervisor; however this technology opens 
a whole new attack vector that can be 
exploited by the bad guys. Nonetheless, 
the likelihood of such an exploit on a 
properly hardened and patched system is 
relatively low. And the benefit of being 
able to use the hypervisor to audit and 
inspect VMs from outside the guest OS 
using virtual communication channels 
provides security professionals new ways 
for monitoring VMs and dealing with 
compromised systems. 
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Mitigated 
Vulnerability Benefit Risk Value 
Natural or Manmade Recovery Time Low 
Disaster 2.70 
Null Hardware Overhead Null 
Null Security Forensics Null 
Null Power Consumption Null 
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Determination 
As mentioned in VM Portability in this 
table, the benefit of recovery time, 
especially during disaster recovery 
planning and in calculating the RTOs and 
RPOs for critical systems, is an enormous 
benefit. The dreaded financial costs of hot 
sites and cold sites are greatly reduced 
because so much less hardware needs to be 
purchased. Multiple VMs can share a 
single piece of hardware, thus drastically 
reducing the fiscal cost of buying and 
maintaining one-to-one physical servers 
and the offsite rental space to house those 
servers. This is one of the primary benefits 
that organizations seek when first 
evaluating hardware virtualization. 
There is no vulnerability for needing less 
hardware in a datacenter. In fact, just the 
opposite. From a security perspective, less 
hardware means less firmware that can be 
compromised, less downtime due to 
hardware failure, and perhaps even fewer 
physical security requirements, such as 
physically secured server and network 
racks. From a fiscal perspective, less 
hardware means big monetary savings. 
This is another benefit which CIO's and 
CFO's happily embrace. 
Giving a forensics investigator the ability to 
replay system attacks is a huge advantage 
when trying to determine how a system was 
compromised. Likewise, being able to roll 
back a compromised system to a previous, 
uninfected state via a snapshot greatly 
reduces the recovery time for a 
compromised system. Rather than having 
to rebuild the system using a backup or 
some other method, an uncompromised 
system can be restored in a matter of 
minutes rather than hours or even days. 
There is no vulnerability associated with 
this benefit. 
Another benefit CIOs and CFOs gladly 
embrace is the fiscal savings brought about 
by having to provide power to fewer 
systems. The difference between having to 
power 20 physical servers versus one 
virtual host with 20 VMs adds up quicker 
than one might expect. Joe Vanden Plas 
estimates the savings could be as much as 
$3,000 per processor (Plas, 2007). Big 
savings indeed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The risk versus benefit analysis demonstrations that 
virtualization can provide a secure, highly beneficial 
technology on which datacenters can be built. Though it 
does possess unique risks in addition to exacerbating 
traditional risks, the likelihood of those vulnerabilities being 
exploited is greatly reduced through appropriate mitigation. 
Special care and a thorough understanding of the technology 
and security best practices are required for the proper 
implementation of a virtual infrastructure. Like any project, 
organizations must bake security into the testing, 
development, and implementation of their virtualization 
plans rather than attempting to secure the environment after 
the fact. Including security in the initial project 
development, through its implementation, and making it a 
key element of ongoing maintenance, is an integral 
component of successfully securing any system (Conklin & 
White, 2010), and virtualization is no exception. 
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of securing a virtual 
infrastructure is the complexity of the system. Virtualization 
adds layers of technology to a datacenter (Scafone, 
Souppaya, & Hoffman, 2010). Not only must you secure the 
server OS, but also the host OS, hypervisor, virtual network, 
virtual hardware, virtual management system, on down the 
line, while also securing the virtual communication channels 
on which all these components communicate. Of course, the 
perplexing terminology of virtualization, with different 
companies and researchers referring to the same technology 
with different names, doesn't help. Nonetheless, a thorough 
understanding of the technology behind virtualization, 
knowing the ingredients that make the special sauce perform 
its magic, is crucial to being able to properly secure a virtual 
infrastructure. 
Most surprising is the paradoxical nature of 
virtualization (Price, 2008). Many of the technologies that 
make it unique are both the source of security risks and the 
foundation for its unique benefits. As Jenni Susan Reuben 
(2007) puts it, "virtualization is both an opportunity and a 
threat." The technology of virtualization is truly a double-
edged sword that cuts both ways, for better and for worse. 
This is yet another reason why it's so important to have a 
firm understanding of the technology, and to incorporate 
security and security processes into the planning stages. 
What may at first appear to be a great fiscal and 
administrative godsend might quickly spiral into a security 
nightmare without proper hardening, mitigation, policies, 
and procedures. 
Virtualization will likely be seen as a paradigm shift for 
the way datacenter architectures are configured and 
managed. Better utilization of hardware, lower maintenance 
and renewal costs, increased availability and portability, and 
a smaller carbon footprint are just a few of the benefits of 
virtualization. It is the cornerstone of cloud computing's 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (Scafone, Souppaya, & 
Hoffman, 2010), and provides the foundation from which 
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Platform as a Service (Paas) and Software as a Service 
(SaaS) is built. Green IT, once considered desirable, is now 
considered essential by most organizations (Symantec, 
2009), and virtualization provides the bedrock on which a 
greener IT is built. It has given disaster recovery, once the 
bane of CFOs around the world due to its costly nature and 
its seemingly improbable purpose, a much needed face lift. 
Overworked in a down economy, system administrators, 
with technologies like snapshots, hot migrations, storage 
migrations, and VM templates, respond to requests for new 
servers and system patching with a smile and a wink instead 
of a grunt and moan. The social relevance of hardware 
virtualization, though perhaps not fully understood at this 
point in its development, is undoubtedly a technical force to 
be reckoned with. As Bill Hau states, virtualization "may 
very well be one of those revolutionary paradigms that could 
fundamentally change the way we think about and approach 
computing." (Hau, 2007). Paradigm or not, virtualization is 
having a profound impact and is likely here to stay. It is our 
duty as security professionals to ensure that it is secure. 
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